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This  paper  tests  the  hypothesis  that  international  migration  experiences  may  promote  better 
institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability. In order to examine this 
question, we use a simple postcard voting experiment designed to capture the population’s desire 
for better governance. Using data from a tailored household survey, we examine the determinants 
of voting behavior in our experiment, and isolate the positive effect of international emigration on 
the demand for political accountability. We find that this effect can be mainly attributed to the 
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Recent research has examined the important role international migration may have for the 
development of origin countries. The positive effects for economic growth of international 
remittances,  return  migrants,  diaspora  effects  promoting  foreign  investment  and 
international trade, and even of emigration of the most educated have by now been rather 
well documented.
1 An important area that has not deserved the same share of attention is 
the role of international migration in the improvement of institutions, which can be crucial 
to economic development, as surveyed by Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
The traditional perspective regards emigration as a “safety valve” or “outside option” that 
allows  individuals  unhappy  with  political  institutions  to  leave  their  home  country.
2 
Emigration could therefore be detrimental to the quality of the domestic political system 
(a form of “brain drain”) by undermining the demand for political accountability, and also 
by hurting the capacity to supply better quality home institutions if those who leave are 
also those most capable of providing these services.  
One can however argue that emigration may promote improved political institutions in 
several  ways:  current  emigrants  may  create  strong  diaspora  effects  whereby  they 
influence political change (via supply, i.e. by influencing local authorities, or via demand, 
for instance through intensified contact of the domestic population with better institutions 
abroad); if return emigrants benefited from an enriching experience abroad, these effects 
can also translate into improvements in the quality of the domestic political institutions 
(via supply, by direct participation in the political system, or via demand, by bringing 
increased awareness and demand for political accountability). 
Theoretically,  therefore,  emigration  might  impact  political  institutions  differently 
depending on the specific context in which it happens. This empirical question is very 
much unanswered in the current literature. In this paper we will test the hypothesis that 
                                                 
1 Evidence of the positive effects of remittances is provided, among others, by Edwards and Ureta (2003) 
for El Salvador, and Yang (2008) for the Philippines. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2003) and Mesnard and 
Ravallion (2006) examine the role of return migration. Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kugler and Rapoport 
(2007) and Javorcik et al. (2007) evaluate the relationship between migrant networks, trade and FDI. The 
possibility of a ‘brain gain’ as opposed to traditional ‘brain drain’ claims is empirically supported by Beine 
et al. (2008) and Batista et al. (2009). 
2 Hirschman (1970) proposed the “exit” vs. “voice” dichotomy, according to which citizens unhappy with 
the  domestic  situation  either  choose  to  emigrate  (exit)  or  to  protest  and  contribute  to  political  change 
(voice).  In  this  setting  that  emigration  may  be  understood  as  a  “safety  valve”,  which  releases  protest 
intensity in the home political system and therefore reduces demand for political improvements. 3 
 
international  migration  experiences  promote  better  institutions  at  home  by  raising  the 
demand for political accountability.  
We propose to examine this research question using a simple postcard voting experiment 
designed  to  capture  the  population’s  demand  for  political  accountability.  Following  a 
survey of perceived corruption in public services, respondents were asked to mail a pre-
stamped  postcard  if  they  wanted  the  (anonymous)  results  of  this  survey  to  be  made 
publicly  available  in  the  media.  This  was  to  happen  if  at  least  50%  of  the  survey 
respondents would mail the postcard back. 
Using tailored data from a purposely designed and conducted household survey in Cape 
Verde, we are able to examine the determinants of voting behavior in our experiment, and 
to  isolate  the  positive  effect  of  international  emigration  on  the  demand  for  political 
accountability. 
For  this  purpose,  we  consider  a  simple  political  economy  framework,  taking  voting 
behavior as the outcome of an expected cost-benefit analysis. In this setting, we need to 
control  for  potentially  varying  voting  costs  (such  as  the  distance  to  the  post,  or  the 
easiness  and  frequency  of  posting  mail)  and  for  alternative  characteristics  affecting 
varying perceived voting benefits (such as  confidence in surveyors, income or family 
structure).  These  variables  are  provided  to  us  by  our  detailed  survey,  customized  to 
examine this question. 
Overall, we find that international emigration seems to positively impact the demand for 
improved political accountability. The effect of return migrants seems to be stronger than 
that of current migrants, and it is especially sizable for the case of migrants to countries 
with better governance. 
Related  empirical  evidence  on  the  impact  of  emigration  on  the  quality  of  political 
institutions is  scarce,  but  there  are  a  few  recent  contributions.  Docquier  et  al.  (2009) 
present  cross-country  evidence  showing  that  over  the  period  1975-2000  overall 
emigration  seems  to  have  positively  impacted  institutional  quality  in  origin  countries, 
although the effect of skilled emigration is ambiguous. Li and McHale (2009) provide a 
detailed  description  of  possible  mechanisms  through  which  skilled  emigration  could 
affect political and economic institutions at home, and present cross-country evidence 
consistent with the view that over 1990-2006 there may indeed be such a positive effect 
on  political  institutions  (particularly  on  political  accountability),  but  not  on  economic 4 
 
institutions. Spilimbergo (2009) offers related evidence on the effect of foreign-educated 
students in promoting democracy in their home countries. He uses evidence from 1960 to 
show that foreign education seems to promote democracy in home countries when it is 
acquired in democratic countries. 
These empirical contributions are consistent with our results, but they cannot distinguish 
between supply and demand forces, nor capture the mechanisms underlying the identified 
effects because they use aggregate data. This paper uses tailored household survey data 
for a single country, which allows focusing more specifically on the impact of emigration 
on the demand for improved political accountability, while aiming at also discriminating 
between  the  impact  of  return  and  current  migrants.  This  approach  is  made  possible 
because  we  propose  an  original  experimental  measure  of  the  desire  for  improved 
governance,  which  allows  us  to  rely  on  within  country  level  variation,  instead  of  the 
traditional cross-country source of variation. The contributions made by these different 
lines of work are necessarily distinct, but we believe complementary. 
In the remainder of the paper, we begin by presenting an overview of our country of 
interest, Cape Verde, as our results should be understood in the setting where the postcard 
experiment  was  conducted.  In  section  3,  we  then  turn  to  presenting  our  experimental 
design,  while  describing  the  theoretical  framework  supporting  our  empirical  strategy. 
Section 4 presents the tailored household survey used in our empirical work, including the 
main descriptive statistics. These data are then used to perform the empirical analysis with 
results presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents concluding remarks. 
2. Cape Verde: a short introduction to the country  
Cape Verde is a nine-island country off the coast of West Africa with 441,000 inhabitants, 
according to the latest INE (2002) census. Its population is concentrated particularly in the 
capital island of Santiago, but is overall very homogeneous in religious and ethnic terms, 
particularly relative to sub-Saharan standards: the index of religious fractionalization as 
computed by Alesina et al. (2003) is 7.66% 
3 (corresponding to 96% of the population 
being  Roman  Catholic);  whereas  the    ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  index  takes  the 
value 41.74% (comparable to countries such as Spain or New Zealand, and in contrast 
                                                 
3 This index is computed as one minus the Herfindahl index of group shares, and expresses the probability 
that two randomly selected individuals from a population belong to different groups. 5 
 
with the top fractionalization observed in 20 sub-Saharan countries where the index takes 
value of more than 80%). 
In terms of institutional history, the country was a Portuguese colony until 1975, when it 
became  independent  and  a  socialist  regime  was  put  in  place  -  a  common  trend  in 
Lusophone Africa at this time. The first free elections only occurred in 1991, but a stable 
democracy has been in place thereafter. In addition, the country benefits from very good 
governance, particularly for sub-Saharan African standards: Cape Verde ranks 47th out of 
180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008, only 
(slightly) behind Botswana and Mauritius; the country was awarded the Best Control of 
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005, again after Botswana, by the World Bank. 
In terms of economic performance, the country is currently ranked by the World Bank as 
a “Lower Middle-Income” economy, and had a GDP per capita of 5900 PPP-Adjusted 
Dollars in 2003, according to Heston et al.  (2006).  Its economic  growth performance 
clearly exceeded the Sub-Saharan African average for GDP per capita growth over 1980-
2004 of 0.6%, again according to Heston et al. (2006). Indeed, Cape Verde was the third 
fastest  country  in  terms  of  per  capita  growth  out  of  the  45  sub-Saharan  countries  in 
Heston  et  al.  (2006),  after  Equatorial  Guinea  (11%  average  annual  growth  rate)  and 
Botswana (5%), both these countries being rich in natural resources and with exports 
accounting for a large fraction of their GDP (47% and 55%, respectively). Cape Verde 
stands out growing at an average annual rate of 4.4% (4.1% over 1981-1990, 5.8% over 
1991-2000) but with exports accounting for only 20% of its GDP and no natural resource 
abundance - rather the opposite, as droughts and famines were recurrent characteristics of 
the country’s history. 
Indeed, droughts and famines were closely related to the massive emigration phenomenon 
that characterizes this country. According to estimates from Batista et al. (2009), based on 
adjusted data for the stock of immigrants in most destination countries, there are around 
100,000 Cape Verdean current emigrants, or about 23% of the population. An additional 
striking feature of Cape Verdean emigration is the magnitude of “brain drain”: according 
to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), 67.5% of the educated labor force of Cape Verde lives 
abroad. This is arguably the largest such number in the African continent, although these 
results  have  been  qualified  by  Batista  et  al.  (2009)  as  depending  particularly  on  the 
definition of educational attainment. Finally, the magnitude of international remittances 
received in Cape Verde is impressive: international remittances account for 16% of GDP 6 
 
over  1987-2003  (World  Bank,  2006),  according  to  official  numbers,  likely 
underestimated, as they do not include informal channels (neither legal nor illegal). This 
magnitude is also especially important given its large relative scale compared to aid and 
foreign direct investment inflows – international remittances have always surpassed FDI 
and have been close to the level of foreign aid, particularly since 2000. 
3. Experimental design and empirical strategy 
Postcard experiment  
This  paper  examines  the  hypothesis  that  international  emigration  may  contribute  to 
promote  the  demand  for  better  governance  at  home.  To  empirically  evaluate  this 
hypothesis, an experiment was conducted such that individual respondents to a survey on 
perceived  corruption  in  public  services  were  offered  the  opportunity  to  make  the 
(anonymous) results of this survey publicly available in the national media for political 
accountability purposes. 
In  order  to  have  the  survey  results  publicized  in  the  media,  survey  respondents  were 
invited  to  participate  in  a  “special  referendum”  immediately  after  they  finished 
responding to the corruption questionnaire. They were offered the opportunity to vote for 
political accountability by taking the incentive-compatible voting action of mailing a pre-
paid postcard. The postcard read “I wish that the conclusions of the survey on the quality 
of national public services (health, education, justice,…), conducted by the University of 
Oxford (UK) in the first months of 2006 to 1000 households in the islands of Santiago, 
São Vicente, Santo Antão, and Fogo, are made public in the Cape Verdean media.” 
4 
The results on perceived corruption in public services were to be made public if 50% or 
more of the postcards were received back. To add credibility to the experiment, a ‘Media 
Contract’ was emphasized by a series of news and interviews broadcasted or published in 
the national television, radio and newspapers while the survey was being conducted in the 
country.
5 
                                                 
4 See the Appendix for a scan of the original postcard in Portuguese. 
5 In particular, these were the news pieces broadcasted and published: 
•  National Television Station - RTC - news broadcasted in the main prime-time news at 8pm (24/01/06); 
•   Radio Nova - interview broadcasted in news (24/01/06); 
•   National Radio – interview broadcasted in the news (24/01/06); 
•   Radio Comercial - news based on press note (24/01/06); 
•   Newspaper Expresso das Ilhas - news based on press note and Radio Nova interview (25/01/06); 7 
 
Theoretical framework 
In  order  to  test  whether  international  emigration  increases  the  desire  for  political 
accountability  at home,  one needs to begin by  setting a framework to  understand the 
determinants of voting in our postcard experiment.  
Political economy theories of turnout and voting potentially relevant for our purposes are 
in large number, as surveyed by Merlo (2006). Following the traditional literature on 
electoral participation, we model voter turnout as the outcome of an expected cost-benefit 
analysis.
6 
Since the postcard distributed to the survey respondents was pre-stamped, the cost of 
voting in our experiment has to do with the opportunity cost of mailing the postcard. This 
cost potentially depends on how familiar the individual is with posting mail, and how 
practical it is for the individual to post mail – individuals who are not used to posting mail 
or for whom it is harder to post mail will likely face higher costs; the same applying to 
individuals with higher labor income.  
The  expected  benefit  of  mailing  the  postcard  has  to  do  with  a  desire  for  political 
accountability  and  this  is  the  main  focus  of  our  analysis.  However,  the  literature 
emphasizes that we should note the expected nature of an individual’s benefit calculation. 
Crucially,  survey  respondents  who  are  more  confident  about  the  trustworthiness  and 
independence  of  the  foreign  institution  sponsoring  the  survey  (as  well  as  about  the 
reliability of the Cape Verdean postal system) will likely attribute a higher probability to 
the public dissemination of the results on perceived corruption.  
The perceived benefit is finally a function of other variables directly affecting the desire 
for  political  accountability.  We  are  most  interested  in  the  effect  of  international 
emigration, but we will need to take into account factors like gender, age, education, 
wealth, or family ties (see, for instance, Alesina and Giuliano, 2009). 
                                                                                                                                                  
•   Newspaper A Semana, based on an interview (26/01/06). 
For additional details and evidence, see http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/cv.htm. 
6 Downs (1957) first provided a ‘calculus of voting’ framework, which was later formalized by Tullock 
(1967) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). Note that because of the simple nature of our voting experiment 
(i.e. a simple decision of whether to vote or not), we can abstract from strategic voting considerations and 
safely assume sincere voting behavior. 8 
 
Empirical strategy 
The voting decision of an individual respondent to our survey can be summarized by the 
following latent variable model: 
) 0 ( 1
* ≥ = i i V V     
i i l i X M V ε α α α + + + = ' 2 1 0
*
 
According to this model, the decision to vote (and therefore demand for better political 
accountability) made by an individual i is given by Vi = 1. This voting decision will occur 
whenever the (unobserved) expected net benefit from voting,   
∗, is positive. 
The expected net benefit from voting first depends on the local emigration history, Ml, 
with impact  1 α  on voting behaviour, which will turn out to be our main estimate of 
interest.
7  
Second, a vector of individual, household and locality characteristics Xi determines costs 
and benefits of mailing the voting postcard. This vector includes individual demographics 
(e.g. age as a determinant of the easiness to mail the postcard, but also of the demand for 
accountability), and individual controls for how familiar someone is with posting mail, 
and how practical this is for her. In addition, there is an individual indicator of confidence 
in the foreign institution sponsoring the survey and experiment. At the household level, 
vector Xi includes variables such as family structure and asset ownership, which are likely 
determinants  of  an  individual’s  subjective  valuation  of  the  benefit  of  improved 
governance. At the locality level, we control for the average expenditure per capita, which 
may  again  influence  the  perceived  benefit  of  better  governance.  All  regressions  also 
include island fixed effects. 
We estimate this empirical model using probit regressions. The source of variation that 
allows us to identify our main coefficient of interest,  1 α , is variation of voting behaviour 
across different localities, after controlling for  a number of individual, household and 
local level characteristics. 
                                                 
7 Note that the concept of locality is that of a census area in Cape Verde, which would roughly correspond 
to a small neighborhood where one would expect social interaction to occur. 9 
 
4. Data description: tailored household survey 
Household Survey Design and Conduction 
Our empirical work is based upon a household survey on migration and the quality of 
public  services  purposely  designed  to  answer  our  research  questions.  The  survey  was 
conducted in Cape Verde from December 2005 to March 2006 by the authors, who were 
affiliated to the University of Oxford. 
The  survey  questionnaire  was  submitted  to  a  representative  sample  of  1066  resident 
households (997 complete interviews) in 5% of the 561 census areas of Cape Verde. This 
sample provided information on both resident non-migrants and return migrants, and also 
on a large sample of current emigrants. The questionnaire included two modules: one on 
perceived quality/corruption of public services; and the other on migration characteristics 
(including  full  migration  histories)  of  the  household.  The  interviewed  household 
representative  (someone  aged  at  least  30  years  old)  was  asked  to  specify  socio-
demographic  characteristics  of  all  members  of  the  household,  including  children  who 
already  lived  elsewhere.  Moreover,  he  was  asked  to  characterize  all  migration  spells 
within the household, including who emigrated, where and when. Finally, there were some 
questions  regarding  the  economic  situation  of  the  household  such  as  living  standards, 
income or whether any member of the family received remittances in the previous year. The 
English translation for the full questionnaire is available at 
 http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/questcveng.pdf. 
The tailored data collection consisted of survey (face-to-face) interviews conducted by 
teams of local interviewers and the authors, who recruited and trained the local teams 
making sure that each interviewer had at least a total of 18 hours of training in groups of 
2-3  individuals.  Training  included  lectures  on  the  content/objectives  of  the  survey; 
answering the questionnaire; and piloting (at least once per interviewer). 
The  sampling  process  was  such  that  sampled  census  areas  were  chosen  randomly 
weighting by the number of households, and households within a census area were chosen 
randomly using standard techniques (nth house, with second visits tried in the same day). 
The eligibility condition for a household to be interviewed was family residence in the 
country  anytime  in  1985-2006.  The  requirement  condition  for  a  respondent  within  a 
household to be interviewed was to be aged at least 30 years old. 10 
 
There are two imperfections to the random sampling of households in the survey. One is 
differences in attempted interviews in the different census areas, and the other is non-
responses. We use weighted data to account for these problems, although differences to 
unweighted  data  are  negligible.  Data  collected  from  non-respondents  on  their  gender, 
approximate  age,  approximate  schooling,  and  approximate  income  are  used  for  this 
purpose. 
Additional details on the fieldwork and survey can be found at  
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/resprogs/corruption/cv/cv.htm. 
Descriptive Statistics 
In this section we briefly characterize the information from our household survey. The 
results in Table 1 show that, relative to residents in Cape Verde, current emigrants tend to 
be slightly disproportionately males and in their prime-working years (21-50 years old). 
They are also more likely to have post-secondary education. Return migrants are strongly 
disproportionately males (both in comparison with residents and current migrants) and are 
mostly aged over 50 years old. They tend to be less educated than current migrants, but 
still overperform residents in terms of the likelihood of a post-secondary education. 
As can be seen from Table 2, the figures for migration flows are relatively close to the 
percentages that are found in the last INE (2002) census for the period 1995-2000, both 
for migrant outflows and returns. These numbers are about 4% of residents for the annual 
outflows of emigrants; and 20% of emigrants for the return flows of emigrants. 
Table 3 displays the main destinations for Cape Verdean emigrants. According to both 
our survey and the INE (2002) census, Portugal and the USA account for respectively 
about 55% and 20% of the total emigration flows.  
Finally, we should note that in the end only 43% of the postcards were returned to us. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we summarize the main empirical results in this paper. In particular, we 
present, interpret and discuss the robustness of our estimates of a ‘demand for political 
accountability gain’ arising from the presence of international emigration. 11 
 
Column  (1)  in  Table  4  presents  the  baseline  estimation  of  the  probability  of  a  given 
survey respondent mailing the postcard she was given. Without controlling for any other 
covariates (except for urban locality and island fixed effects), there seems to be a striking 
statistically significant difference between the postcard voting probability of localities with 
more and less migrants relative to residents (+1.07pp in the probability of voting for each 
additional  1pp  in  the  local  fraction  of  emigrants,  including  both  current  and  return 
migrants). Controlling for a number of individual and household level relevant covariates, 
columns (2-4) in Table 4 show how the observed voting differences are basically kept. The 
signs of all significant coefficients are as expected and do not vary as additional controls are 
included. Column (5) shows what happens when the average per capita expenditure in a 
locality is added as a control: it reduces the estimated coefficient to 0.71. This may be 
understood  as  evidence  that  in  the  absence  of  this  control,  international  migration  was 
proxying for important local financial characteristics, which raises the question of whether 
international remittances may matter as determinants of the desire for better governance. 
The  results  in  column  (6)  show  that  this  does  not  seem  the  case:  including  the  local 
proportion  of  households  receiving  international  remittances  has  an  economic  and 
statistically  insignificant  impact  and  does  not  affect  the  estimated  coefficients  and 
significances of the other posting determinants included in the regression. 
Our baseline estimates are therefore presented in column (5) of Table 4. An interesting 
effect  is  that  of  a  strong  negative  income/wealth  effect  on  the  demand  for  more 
accountability. Having annual labor income with a negative estimated coefficient would be 
difficult to interpret directly as a negative income effect as this could simply be proxying 
the opportunity cost (time value) of mailing the postcard. However, this effect also shows 
strongly for asset ownership: wealthier people seem to value less the benefits of political 
accountability.  At  the  local  level,  though,  the  results  consistently  point  to  the  average 
expenditure per capita as positively influencing postcard mailing behavior. 
Table 5 presents the results of using different proxies for the cost of mailing the postcard 
and the trustworthiness of doing so. Column (1) presents our baseline. Columns (2) to (5) 
show that the sign, significance and magnitude of the different estimated coefficients on 
local international emigration do not seem to be strongly affected by the choice of these 
controls.  In  fact,  none  of  these  controls  ever  becomes  statistically  significant  in  our 
estimated  specifications.  This  is  consistent  with  the  idea  that,  although  incentive-
compatible, the costs of mailing the voting postcard are of small importance. 12 
 
Table 6 investigates whether the probability of mailing a postcard may depend on actual 
experience and perception of corruption by survey respondents. Indeed, we find this to be 
the case: those who perceive more corruption in the health and education sectors (those with 
whom most respondents had contact with) are significantly more likely to mail the postcard. 
The impact of perceived corruption slightly affects the magnitude and significance of the 
impact of international emigration, but it does so in a way that is not systematically upward 
or downwards. Overall, the sign, order of magnitude and broad statistical significance of the 
effect of international migration are kept throughout the different specifications.  
Given the existing evidence on “brain gain”, namely as found by Batista et al. (2009), we 
must address the question of whether local education affects the way local international 
migration generates a desire for political accountability. Table 7 addresses this question. 
Comparing  with  the  baseline  column  (1),  columns  (2)-(3)  show  that  considering  local 
educational attainment (namely intermediate secondary and secondary schooling) basically 
does  not  change  the  sign,  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  of  the  impact  of  local 
migration on the demand for political accountability. Post-secondary education, however, 
increases  both  the  size  and  magnitude  of  the  migration  effects,  although  the  positive 
coefficient on post-secondary education is not significant at conventional levels, as can be 
seen in column (4). 
Column (1) in Table 8 again presents our baseline. This compares to the separate effects of 
local migrants to Portugal and the US displayed in column (2). The results are striking in 
that only emigrants to the US seem to have had a sizable and significant impact on the 
desire  for  better  governance.  This  result  should  be  understood  in  light  of  the  latest 
Transparency International (2009) cross-country governance ranking: the US are placed 19
th 
in the world, whereas Portugal is ranked 35
th and Cape Verde 46
th. This evidence can be 
interpreted as the experience of emigrants to the US being more conducive to promoting 
demand for better governance than that of emigrants to Portugal.  
Finally, in column (3) of Table 8, we distinguish between the effects of current and return 
migrants. The results are striking: the magnitude and significance of effects are much higher 
for return than for current migrants, regardless of their country of destination. This is an 
intuitive result, as the actual presence of individuals with migrant experience is more likely 
to induce effects in their community of residence after their return than while they are still 
away. Note also that the effects of both return and current migrants to the United States are 
positive, whereas the effect of migrants returning from Portugal is actually negative. To 13 
 
interpret this negative result, one should bear in mind that the baseline destinations against 
which migrants to the US and Portugal are being compared are mostly European, such as 
France and the Netherlands, which rank closer to the US in terms of governance.  
In summary, the evidence we gathered points to international emigration to countries with 
good governance (and in particular the presence of return migrants) to promote the demand 
for political accountability in origin countries. We focus on impacts at the locality level, 
where one would expect social interaction to occur. This effect should be broader and 
more meaningful than simply considering migration at the household level, which would 
also introduce a selection problem to the analysis.
8 Our findings are consistent with strong 
social effects of international migration in promoting demand for political accountability, 
in  addition  to  simple  household  level  effects.  Unfortunately,  we  miss  data  on  social 
networks, which could allow us to further investigate this line of thought. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This  paper  aims  at  contributing  to  the  understanding  of  a  largely  unmeasured  but 
extremely important potential effect of international emigration: the impact of migration 
on institutional quality, which likely acts as a determinant of economic growth.  
Our findings point to an overall positive impact of international emigration on the demand 
for improved political accountability in the country of origin we study. In particular, our 
results  emphasize  the  importance  of  the  destination  country  of  migrants:  effects  are 
stronger  for  migrants  to  countries  with  better  governance.  Our  work  also  indicates  a 
stronger impact of return migrants actually back to the origin country, relative to current 
emigrants which can only indirectly influence their networks in the home country. 
We  naturally  recognize  that  international  emigration  likely  affects  the  supply  side  of 
domestic political institutions as well, a part of the lively ongoing “brain drain” vs. “brain 
gain” debate. Effects could presumably be negative if there is positive selection in current 
emigration flows or could be positive in presence of skilled return migrants. This is a very 
interesting empirical question that we leave for future research. 
                                                 
8  We  nevertheless  estimated  the  instrumented  effect  of  household  migration  on  the  demand  for  better 
governance and also found positive effects, although not statistically significant. These results are available 
from the authors upon request.  14 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Cape Verdean individuals depending on migrant status. 
  
Non-Migrants  Current 
Migrants  Return Migrants 
Gender 
Male  47.95%  51.99%  64.46% 
Age 
0-10 years  21.39%  0.35%  2.42% 
11-20 years  28.63%  11.19%  4.85% 
21-30 years  12.91%  33.92%  5.45% 
31-40 years  13.05%  25.00%  17.58% 
41-50 years  10.14%  20.45%  15.76% 
51-60 years  4.44%  8.04%  11.52% 
61-70 years  4.24%  0.87%  18.79% 
71-80 years  3.80%  0.17%  20.61% 
81-90 years  1.19%  0.00%  3.03% 
>91 years  0.02%  0.00%  0.00% 
Education (males aged 15-64) 
No Education  3.72%  3.6%  5.2% 
Pre-school  1.54%  0.7%  0.0% 
Alphabetized  11.35%  8.2%  14.3% 
Primary  59.69%  62.4%  50.7% 
Intermediate Secondary  18.79%  9.9%  19.5% 
Secondary  1.12%  0.4%  3.9% 
Post-Secondary  3.78%  14.9%  6.5% 
Source: Own survey. 
 
 






Table 2: Migration flows. 
  
Own Survey   International 
Censuses 
Flow of emigrants as % of residents in Cape Verde   
Between 2000 and 2005  3.96%   
Between 1995 and 2000    2.80% 
     
Flow of return migrants as % of current emigrants   
Between 2000 and 2005  19%   
Between 1995 and 2000    25% 
Source: Own survey, INE (2002) and international censuses of destination countries (Portugal, 










Table 3: Main destinations of Cape Verdean emigrants. Percentage of total emigration flows. 
   Own Survey 
2000-2005 
Cape Verde Census  
1995-2000  
Portugal  54  55 
US  21  19 
France  12  8 
Netherlands  2  5 
Luxemburg  2  - 
Brazil  3  - 
Other  6  13 
Source: Own survey and INE (2002).  
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Table 4: Probability of mailing voting postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Local proportion of 
international migrants  
1.0679  1.0131  1.0629  1.0724  0.7094  0.7082 
(0.3118)*** (0.3475)*** (0.3584)*** (0.3510)*** (0.3128)** (0.3080)** 
Trust in Oxford University  0.0050  0.0202  0.0228  0.0305  0.0305 
(0.0231)  (0.0230)  (0.0226)  (0.0239)  (0.0238) 
Habit of posting  0.0079  0.0107  0.0100  0.0079  0.0079 
(0.0127)  (0.0127)  (0.0127)  (0.0132)  (0.0132) 
Male  -0.0851  -0.0928  -0.0774  -0.0774 
(0.0480)*  (0.0467)**  (0.0471)  (0.0472) 
Age  0.0210  0.0161  0.0144  0.0145 
(0.0135)  (0.0143)  (0.0141)  (0.0142) 
Age^2  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Individual labor income  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0003 
(0.0001)**  (0.0001)** (0.0001)** (0.0001)** 
Number of children  0.0205  0.0219  0.0219 
(0.0120)*  (0.0123)*  (0.0123)* 
Household asset ownership  -0.1401  -0.1266  -0.1266 
(0.0626)** (0.0639)** (0.0641)** 
Local average expenditure per 
capita 
1.4084  1.4056 
(0.5794)** (0.6284)** 





Observations  472  458  455  452  452  452 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  
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Table 5: Probability of mailing voting postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Local proportion of international 
migrants 
0.7094  0.6728  0.5663  0.6137  0.6859 
(0.3128)**  (0.3101)**  (0.3436)*  (0.3214)*  (0.3129)** 
Trust in Oxford University  0.0305  0.0433  0.0339  0.0271  0.0320 
(0.0239)  (0.0285)  (0.0242)  (0.0243)  (0.0249) 
Habit of posting  0.0079  0.0074  0.0055  0.0049  0.0062 
   (0.0132)  (0.0136)  (0.0135)  (0.0143)  (0.0129) 
Confidence in postal system  -0.0150 
(0.0258) 
Time distance to postbox  -0.0016 
(0.0134) 
Comfort in posting mail  0.0123 
(0.0146) 
Waits to walk by postbox  -0.0682 
(0.1899) 
Gives (taxi) driver to post  0.1656 
(0.1649) 
Gives to family member to post  0.0737 
(0.1341) 
Gives to mailman  0.3592 
(0.2662) 
Goes to postbox on purpose  0.0811 
   (0.1103) 
Male  -0.0774  -0.0794  -0.0726  -0.0802  -0.0800 
(0.0471)  (0.0473)*  (0.0470)  (0.0474)*  (0.0486)* 
Age  0.0144  0.0155  0.0154  0.0162  0.0155 
(0.0141)  (0.0146)  (0.0140)  (0.0141)  (0.0141) 
Age^2  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0002 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Individual labor income  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003 
(0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)** 
Number of children  0.0219  0.0233  0.0213  0.0218  0.0219 
(0.0123)*  (0.0130)*  (0.0122)*  (0.0127)*  (0.0124)* 
Household asset ownership  -0.1266  -0.1678  -0.1227  -0.1494  -0.1237 
(0.0639)**  (0.0626)***  (0.0637)*  (0.0596)**  (0.0638)* 
Local average expenditure per capita  1.4084  1.4070  1.5009  1.3869  1.4307 
   (0.5794)**  (0.5975)**  (0.6310)**  (0.5879)**  (0.5767)** 
Observations  452  435  443  445  451 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: Probability of mailing voting postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Local proportion of international migrants  0.7094  0.5915  0.9314 
   (0.3128)**  (0.3280)*  (0.3355)*** 
Perceived corruption in health sector  0.0379 
(0.0149)** 
Perceived corruption in education sector  0.0393 
         (0.0147)*** 
Trust in Oxford University  0.0305  0.0393  0.0323 
(0.0239)  (0.0263)  (0.0263) 
Habit of posting  0.0079  0.0021  0.0054 
(0.0132)  (0.0136)  (0.0138) 
Male  -0.0774  -0.0726  -0.0855 
(0.0471)  (0.0539)  (0.0534) 
Age  0.0144  0.0147  0.0069 
(0.0141)  (0.0152)  (0.0158) 
Age^2  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Individual labor income  -0.0003  -0.0002  -0.0002 
(0.0001)**  (0.0001)*  (0.0001)** 
Number of children  0.0219  0.0200  0.0332 
(0.0123)*  (0.0137)  (0.0148)** 
Household asset ownership  -0.1266  -0.1746  -0.0989 
(0.0639)**  (0.0565)***  (0.0646) 
Local average expenditure per capita  1.4084  1.3969  1.4946 
   (0.5794)**  (0.5919)**  (0.6112)** 
Observations  452  426  400 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: Probability of mailing voting postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Local proportion of international migrants  0.7094  0.7158  0.6921  0.7835 
   (0.3128)**  (0.3119)**  (0.3260)**  (0.2969)*** 
Local ratio of population completing relative to population 
not completing intermediate secondary schooling 
0.0594 
(0.2055) 
Local ratio of population completing relative to 
population not completing secondary schooling 
-0.1379 
(0.2530) 
Local ratio of population completing relative to 
population not completing university education  
1.2626 
         (0.9505) 
Trust in Oxford University  0.0305  0.0307  0.0294  0.0326 
(0.0239)  (0.0241)  (0.0238)  (0.0237) 
Habit of posting  0.0079  0.0078  0.0079  0.0077 
(0.0132)  (0.0133)  (0.0132)  (0.0133) 
Male  -0.0774  -0.0765  -0.0781  -0.0782 
(0.0471)  (0.0474)  (0.0470)*  (0.0477) 
Age  0.0144  0.0142  0.0148  0.0147 
(0.0141)  (0.0141)  (0.0142)  (0.0143) 
Age^2  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Individual labor income  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003 
(0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)** 
Number of children  0.0219  0.0221  0.0214  0.0232 
(0.0123)*  (0.0124)*  (0.0124)*  (0.0125)* 
Household asset ownership  -0.1266  -0.1268  -0.1244  -0.1346 
(0.0639)**  (0.0637)**  (0.0643)*  (0.0652)** 
Local average expenditure per capita  1.4084  1.2486  1.6259  0.7374 
   (0.5794)**  (0.7790)  (0.7650)**  (0.7782) 
Observations  452  452  452  452 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8: Probability of mailing voting postcard. Marginal effects of probit regressions. 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Local proportion of international migrants  0.7094       
   (0.3128)**       
Local proportion of migrants to Portugal  0.2808 
(1.1098) 
Local proportion of migrants to US  2.3031 
      (1.0107)**    
Local proportion of current migrants to Portugal  0.9778 
(1.3133) 
Local proportion of return migrants to Portugal  -5.2183 
(2.6664)* 
Local proportion of current migrants to US  0.0671 
(2.6015) 
Local proportion of return migrants to US  4.8899 
         (2.0178)** 
Trust in Oxford University  0.0305  0.0327  0.0288 
(0.0239)  (0.0232)  (0.0228) 
Habit of posting  0.0079  0.0085  0.0101 
(0.0132)  (0.0139)  (0.0139) 
Male  -0.0774  -0.0699  -0.0720 
(0.0471)  (0.0475)  (0.0471) 
Age  0.0144  0.0152  0.0152 
(0.0141)  (0.0145)  (0.0144) 
Age^2  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
(0.0001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Individual labor income  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003 
(0.0001)**  (0.0001)**  (0.0001)** 
Number of children  0.0219  0.0229  0.0225 
(0.0123)*  (0.0124)*  (0.0123)* 
Household asset ownership  -0.1266  -0.1195  -0.1201 
(0.0639)**  (0.0626)*  (0.0635)* 
Local average expenditure per capita  1.4084  1.2555  1.1474 
   (0.5794)**  (0.5903)**  (0.5994)* 
Observations  452  452  452 
Urban locality dummy and island fixed effects included in all regressions. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at locality level.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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